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There have been many changes since the first Food and Drug Act was passed in 1906.  
In 1938, legislation established the requirement that drugs be proven safe prior to 
marketing.   In 1962 the Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the Food and Drug Act, added 
the requirement that manufacturers prove that their drugs actually had the effect for 
which they would market it.  This was a huge change, and resulted in an extensive 
review of all drugs marketed up to that time to determine whether they met the new 
requirements.  Other major changes since then would include the 1976 Medical Device 
Amendments, setting new standards for the approval of medical devices and 
requirements for post-market safety surveillance; the accelerated approval regulations 
issued in 1991, permitting early approval on the basis of a less-than-definitive endpoint 
for which there was reasonable plausibility that effect on that endpoint would predict 
effect on the outcome of interest; and the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, 
which for the first time established deadlines for review of applications in exchange for 
user fees paid by companies submitting applications.  Much legislation targeted at the 
FDA and the way it does business has been passed over the past 20-25 years, but for 
the most part these actions “established” pathways to regulatory action that already 
existed.  For example, the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 stated that a single clinical 
trial with other supportive data might be sufficient to warrant marketing approval, but the 
FDA always had that authority and many drugs had been approved over the years on 
this basis.  
 
The FDA’s approach to innovative ideas about study design and analysis is undoubtedly 
cautious.  It is certainly natural to be cautious about new approaches to the design and 
analysis of studies when you have the responsibility for the safety of the American 
public in your hands, but there is also the responsibility to take advantage of new 
approaches that could improve the efficiency of review while not increasing errors.  That 
means that the FDA needs to be continually and actively assessing innovative 
approaches to its decision-making processes.  The question of when a new approach is 
sufficiently well established to be the basis of the types of decisions the FDA has to 
make is “in the eyes of the beholder;”  it is rare when a new design or analytical 
approach quickly becomes the standard (as happened in the early 1970s after Cox’s 
paper (Cox, JRSS B, 1972) demonstrating an improved approach to survival analysis).  
A good example of the difficulties in determining the benefits and risks of a new 
approach is the area of surrogate endpoints.  The FDA has approved drugs based on 
laboratory or physical measurement data for decades:  antihypertensive drugs for 
lowering blood pressure, vaccines for establishing protective antibody levels, antiviral 
drugs for HIV that control the virus to below undetectable levels.  In such cases, the 
connection between an effect on the surrogate and the expected effect on the clinical 
outcome are both highly plausible and have been confirmed (to the satisfaction of most) 
by extensive epidemiological studies and meta-analysis of clinical trials.  But huge 
numbers of potential surrogate endpoints have been proposed but not accepted (yet) as 
a basis for regulatory approval.  Case in point:  the laboratory marker prostate specific 
antigen (PSA) was touted for years as a measure that could serve as a clinical trial 
endpoint and regulatory approval, thereby speeding up drug  development for treatment 
of prostate cancer.  Many approaches to a PSA endpoint were advocated:  simple 
change in PSA, PSA rise above a threshold, PSA velocity, changes in PSA velocity, 
etc..  There has been much debate within the community of urologic oncologists, and 
many analyses have been presented to support particular points of view.  However, no 
consensus in the research community has been reached (Gomella et al, 2014); in fact, 
increased skepticism emerged about the validity of PSA measures as surrogates for 
recurrence of prostate cancer.  The FDA’s caution about using any PSA-based 
algorithm as a basis for drug approval (or accelerated approval) seems warranted.    
 
A big problem with surrogates is that while they might predict the desired effect on the 
clinical outcome of interest, they typically provide no information about potential safety 
outcomes (Fleming and DeMets, Ann Int Med, 1996).   For example, growing evidence 
about safety issues emerging with antidiabetic drugs approved on the basis of the 
surrogate measure HgA1C, have led the Agency to back away from reliance entirely on 
the surrogate and requiring substantial additional information on safety.   
New approaches to study design and analysis are emerging all the time.  FDA tends to 
be very open to innovative methods for early phase trials, as long as they do not 
perceive that the approach will put trial participants at unacceptable risk.  Bayesian 
adaptive approaches and multi-stage designs are frequently used to make preliminary 
assessments of safety and efficacy; companies are relatively free to determine the 
approach they will take to determine whether to continue to develop an investigational 
product.  When it comes time to conduct a Phase 3 trial to make definitive assessments 
of safety and efficacy, however, the FDA will strongly encourage approaches that are 
widely used in the scientific community and understood to yield valid results and protect 
against bias.   
 
While there are, and always will be, ongoing debates about the optimal statistical 
approaches to design and analysis, and whether regulatory and funding agencies are 
too slow (or too fast) to adopt newer approaches advocated as improving efficiency 
and/or accuracy of findings,  more serious challenges to the working of regulatory 
agencies have called for reversion to the time prior to the 1962 legislation that 
mandated demonstration of efficacy in addition to safety before a drug could be legally 
marketed.   Such calls have been motivated by desire for access to potentially life-
saving drugs at early stages of investigation, but also by a libertarian philosophy that 
decisions about one’s health care should be subject to minimal restrictions and 
assumptions that freer use of medical products will ultimately lead to knowledge about 
the most effective approaches.  This reactionary perspective on medical product 
regulation is extremely dangerous and short-sighted and would jeopardize continued 
gains in public health improvements. 
 
Why dangerous?  A medical product can cause benefit or harm—any agent with active 
ingredients will produce some effect.  If there is no need to prove benefit, many 
products will be marketed that will cause only harm; most products in early stages of 
development are never shown to be effective (see for example U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration 2017), but all these products could be marketed under the libertarian 
approach to regulation.  It is folly to imagine that those causing serious harm would be 
identified quickly.  Consider the case of antiarrhythmic drugs, proven to treat life-
threatening arrhythmias effectively but that became widely used to prevent arrhythmias 
following myocardial infarction on the assumption that such use would save lives.  But a 
randomized placebo-controlled trial showed that use of these drugs to prevent 
arrhythmias tripled the rate of sudden death (Echt et al, NEJM, 1991)!  It is sobering to 
realize that an increase of this magnitude went unrecognized until a controlled trial was 
conducted.  A similar but somewhat less dramatic example is that of hormone 
replacement in postmenopausal women, long thought to lessen the risk of 
cardiovascular outcomes but shown definitively in a randomized trial that such therapy 
actually increased this risk (Manson et al, NEJM 2003).   
 
The clinical trials that demonstrated the harm caused by these products were not 
performed by industry; they were funded by the National Institutes of Health, which 
recognized the need to evaluate products being widely used for effects that were 
unproven.   But if a plethora of new products floods the market, research agencies, 
foundations, and other groups that perform clinical trials, will be unable to take over the 
task of rigorously evaluating these products, tasks that should rightly fall to the 
commercial companies that will market and profit from them.  The public will be faced 
with an increasing number of treatment options with no guidance as to which one(s) will 
actually work.  Those affected will include individuals with life-threatening conditions 
who may now have access to a great many possible treatments with no data to help 
them choose the one most likely to help them.   
 
Back in the 1980s and 1990s, the AIDS activists, who faced what was then an inevitably 
fatal disease with very limited treatment options, and who were extremely effective in 
getting public attention to their demands, advocated for expanded access programs to 
allow use of drugs with promising but preliminary evidence of safety and efficacy, and 
were instrumental in the development of the accelerated approval regulations that 
remain in place today.  They stopped well short, however, of pushing for wide access to 
drugs based only on a limited amount of safety information.  They recognized that what 
they needed were treatments that were proven to work—that a medicine cabinet full of 
drugs with no information about whether they would help or harm you was useless 
(Gonsalves and Zuckerman, BMJ 2015).   They became strong advocates for rigorous 
trials that would give their community reliable guidance on therapeutic and prophylactic 
approaches for those infected with HIV.  Other patient advocacy groups have taken 
similar stands.  In the end, if serious challenges are mounted against our current system 
of medical product regulation, the loudest voices of protest may come from patients and 
their advocacy groups.  They have the most to lose.  
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 “We actually believe in a strong, science-led FDA. We are a science-led organization 
that strives to hit high scientific standards and so we would expect the FDA to be well 
staffed and focused also on those standards.” – Pascal Soriot, Chief Executive of 
AstraZeneca 
The FDA, like other regulatory bodies in other areas, straddles a knife edge between 
being too rigid and being too lenient. Decisions that regulators make preventing change 
(or, as anti-regulators would say, “obstructing change”) can stifle innovation. On the 
other hand, over-permissiveness courts irreversible harm. As I write this, leaders of our 
US government speak in the voice of deniers of science. Regulators’ failure to act can 
destroy our air, our rivers and streams, our oceans, the very way we live. If FDA 
regulators, who have in the last several decades based their judgments on science, 
begin to march to the drumbeat of anti-science, ineffective and even dangerous drugs 
and devices can enter the market. As the quotation from Soriot above exemplifies, 
responsible pharmaceutical manufacturers strongly support regulatory actions that 
reflect scientific data and judgment. Moreover, many patient advocacy groups have 
courageously defended the need for science in drug and device development. When we 
speak of “science”, however, we must remember that no one - not investigators, not 
companies, and not regulators - have a monopoly on what characterizes good science. 
Prior to 1962, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act required drug companies to show that 
their drugs were “safe”. But one cannot judge safety in the absence of data on efficacy. 
The Kefauver-Harris amendment of 1962 required that a drug also had to show 
substantial evidence of effectiveness for its intended use. Robert Temple of the FDA 
has pointed out, "That evidence had to consist of adequate and well-controlled studies, 
a revolutionary requirement."[i]As a consequence of that amendment and its 
“revolutionary requirement”, the FDA began to regulate clinical studies in a more 
scientifically serious way. Since that time, the FDA has made major contributions to 
improving the design and conduct clinical trials which, in turn, has led to approval of 
safe and effective products and has prevented unsafe, ineffective products from 
entering the market. The same process that has led to rational decision-making in the 
past should be effective in this era of personalized medicine and new statistical 
methods. 
Recently, populists have urged more direct advertising of drugs to the public. I hope that 
Congress moves instead to stricter regulation of this type of advertisement. The toxic 
combination of the public’s lack of understanding of science coupled with Madison 
Avenue’s skill at selling threatens public health. The cry for less immunization has led to 
increases in preventable communicable diseases[ii]; the public’s insistence on 
antibiotics for viral infections has abetted the growth of resistant bacteria. Until we as a 
society are willing to spend the money on valid science education (don’t hold your 
breath), regulators and a wide swath of the public should fight this push to expansion of 
direct advertising. 
Of course, the FDA has made mistakes over the six decades since 1962. Some 
approved drugs and devices have turned out to cause harms too great for their benefits 
and, undoubtedly, some effective products have not been approved. Sometimes the 
FDA has been subject to strong political pressure to approve, or not to approve, specific 
products. Errors in both directions are inevitable in a system as complicated and large 
as the industry the FDA regulates. If the FDA continues with no change, I suspect we 
will continue to see better drugs and devices enter the market. Moreover, the FDA has 
been thoughtfully struggling with assessing products post-approval; the Agency needs 
to continue, and even expand, its work in this area. 
So my quick answer is “no” to the question of whether the FDA needs major change in 
the way it regulates. For the health of the public, the FDA still must base its judgments 
on approval from carefully performed controlled trials, usually randomized, that address 
important clinical questions in a way that allows rigorous evaluation of the product’s 
safety and efficacy. The FDA’s behavior over the course of these last 60 years has 
shown that it is not static; it has been open to innovation and improvement in design of 
studies and in their statistical analysis. Thus, if the FDA continues in its current path, the 
future is likely to see thoughtful, intelligent advances in methodology. In order to 
continue to do its job effectively, however, the FDA needs adequate staffing which, of 
course, means adequate funding. An overworked bureaucracy cannot be expected to 
drive innovation or even to keep abreast of innovation made outside its walls. 
Assuming adequate funding, how can the FDA improve itself with the view towards 
more rapid decision-making but still maintain rigor? If one believes, as I do, that the 
basic structure is in place – a dedicated workforce that is eager to support bringing safe 
and effective products to market – radical change is not necessary and, in fact, is likely 
to be detrimental to the public health. Some small changes, however, can make big 
differences. The frustration many people (including me) often feel with the FDA stems 
not primarily from the Agency’s failure to innovate, but from more mundane problems 
related to process and, I contend, an apparent disregard of the needs and motivations 
of pharmaceutical and device companies. Below I give some examples – all come from 
actual cases but for reasons of confidentiality, I mask the diseases, drugs, and 
Divisions. 
A major frustration experienced by those of us who work with or for drug and device 
companies comes from the fact that different Divisions seem to have dramatically 
different criteria for approval. I speak here not only of the differences between the 
Center for devices and the Centers for drugs and biologics, for those operate under 
different laws. I speak to Divisions within the same Center. Within the Center for Drugs, 
some Divisions approve drugs on the basis of outcomes that other Divisions would call 
surrogates. 
Currently, acceptable statistical methods differ from Division to Division. What is 
important is whether the method makes sense in a particular case. Some Divisions or 
review teams appear to pay little attention to missing data – at least for continuous 
measures – or use methods many statisticians regard as inappropriate (e.g., last 
observation or baseline observation carried forward, LOCF or BOCF). A review of 
approvals in 2016 will show examples of continuous measures that simply ignored 
participants who did not have their final measurement (i.e., so-called “completers” 
analyses). Other Divisions will require methods that utilize techniques described in Little 
et al.[iii] [iv], a report commissioned by the FDA itself. It is not sensible, however, to 
compare the results of a trial that uses these more conservative methods to trials that 
have in the past used less rigorous ones. As science, including statistical methodology, 
advances, the standards for approval must take the attendant changes into account. 
Otherwise, the bar for approval may become unattainable. 
When the FDA has a set of questions that it sends to a company on a Friday afternoon 
with a requirement for an answer on Monday morning, or, worse, on the night before 
Thanksgiving expecting an answer the following Monday, or the day before Christmas 
with required answers by the end of the calendar year, the recipient companies 
understandably become frustrated and angry. Staff members must cancel their 
vacations; someone else has to do the cooking, etc. These and similar actions by FDA 
reviewers may satisfy the reviewers’ assigned timelines, but the angst it brings to 
companies translates into negativity toward the FDA as whole. 
Or consider the case of reviewing a Statistical Analysis Plan (SAP). FDA staff must 
understand that companies plan very carefully when databases will be locked and when 
the top line results will be ready (of course, the best laid plans often do go aft agley). 
Timing of the component processes is orchestrated carefully to satisfy investor needs 
and SEC requirements. To ensure meeting timelines, the programs must be ready to 
run as soon as the data are unlocked. The FDA tosses a monkey wrench into the 
process when it does not provide comments on the SAP for many months, and does not 
warn the company that a review is coming. If the comments arrive prior to database 
lock, all that is lost is money and time – which is bad enough. But if the comments arrive 
after the database lock and the statistical staff is already unblinded, the company finds 
itself in an untenable position. It cannot say it made changes to the SAP prior to 
unblinding; that is patently untrue. On the other hand, failure to “obey” the FDA is very 
risky. And now there is no time for dialogue between the company and the FDA. 
So what should the FDA do to improve its relationship to developers and, ultimately, to 
speed the process of development and approval? 
First, the FDA must maintain rigorous standards; that is, it must continue to set a high 
bar for approval. It must not succumb to the current arguments from the new 
administration and elsewhere that approvals should be based only on safety, not 
efficacy.  Lack of rigor is not what responsible drug developers are asking for. “Having a 
high bar is a good thing… because it allows innovators to compete,” says Len Schleifer, 
Chief Executive of Regeneron. 
Second, increase the staff at the FDA. This may be a hard sell while the government is 
belt-tightening, but an overworked staff cannot perform maximally effectively. Our own 
staff tells our demanding clients that as statisticians we can produce work with two, but 
not three, of the qualities they want: speed, accuracy, and low cost. So it is with any 
group doing complicated work. If we, the US public, want the FDA to work quickly and to 
get the “right” answers, our society must give the Agency enough money to hire and 
maintain qualified staff. 
Third, train the staff well so that they understand the issues involved in the project with 
which they are dealing and institute a careful process for reviewing reviews. This may 
require much more cross-Division discussion among entry-level reviewers, medical and 
statistical, than I suspect is happening. FDA staff needs to be conversant with the legal 
standards applied to the science they are reviewing. Training means attending 
professional meetings – staff members should be encouraged to attend relevant 
meetings even when they are not presenting papers themselves. 
Fourth, ensure that that staff appreciate the complexities of actually performing trials. 
Often an FDA review team imposes requirements that fly in the face of practicalities. 
The FDA should not assume that just because new graduates are up-to-date in science 
and methods they understand the context of a clinical trial, the typical standard of care 
in the disease under study, or the application of a method to a real problem. We as 
statisticians are often taught through “toy” examples that simplify the context of a 
problem in order to highlight a mathematical or statistical issue; real-life is cluttered with 
violations of simplicity. 
Fifth, have the staff imbibe the maxim: “Your lack of planning is not my emergency”. The 
imbalance between the regulator and the regulated means that when the FDA imposes 
an unrealistic deadline (probably because of lack of planning or too small a staff), the 
company treats the request as an emergency demand. And that leads to lasting 
irritation with the FDA – not a good path for collaborative interaction. 
These five steps are not revolutionary – they do not constitute an overhaul in the way 
the FDA is doing business. They are not easy to institute, but following them shorten the 
time to approval of drugs, increase the quality of discussion, and reduce the tension 
between regulator and those they regulate. 
 
 
[i] Robert Temple, quoted in 
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The FDA is unprepared for the new world of personalized medicine. Consider what is possible 
now that nearly everyone carries with them the processing power of a 1990s Cray 
supercomputer. Smartphones equipped with sensors can monitor blood pressure, perform 
ECGs, even analyze DNA. Other devices being developed or available now include contact lens 
that can track glucose levels and eye pressure, real-time gait analysis, and head-bands that 
monitor and even adjust your brain waves. 
The FDA has an inconsistent even schizophrenic attitude towards these new devices—some 
have been approved and yet at the same time the FDA has banned 23andMe and other direct 
to consumer genetic testing companies from offering some DNA tests because of “the risk that a 
test result may be used by a patient to self-manage”. To be sure, the FDA and other agencies 
have a role in ensuring that a test does what it says it does (the Theranos debacle shows the 
utility of that oversight). But the FDA should not be limiting the information that patients may 
discover about their own bodies or the advice that may be given based on that information. 
Interference of this kind violates the first amendment and the long-standing doctrine that the 
FDA does not control the practice of medicine.    
The world of personalized medicine has implications going beyond new devices and 
technologies. It also impacts how new drugs and devices must be evaluated. The more we look 
at people and diseases the more we learn that both are radically heterogeneous. In the past, 
patients have been classified and drugs prescribed according to a handful of phenomenological 
characteristics such as age and gender and occasionally race or ethnic background. Today, 
however, genetic testing and on-the-fly examination of RNA transcripts, proteins, antibodies and 
metabolites can provide a much more precise guide to the effect of pharmaceuticals in a person 
at a particular time. Drug targeting can reduce both adverse reactions and adverse non-
reactions. 
Targeting is beneficial but as Peter Huber has emphasized it means that drug development 
becomes much less a question of does this drug work for the average person and much more 
about can we identify in a large group of people the subset who will benefit from the drug? If we 
stick to standard methods that means every larger and more expensive clinical trials and more 
drug lag and drug loss. The FDA is already too conservative, as Andrew Lo, among others has 
shown. The FDA is conservative because when it approves a bad drug its error is visible but 
when it fails to approve good drugs the dead are buried in an invisible graveyard. The 
asymmetry of error visibility and the potential of personalized medicine both suggest that we 
allow for more liberal approval decisions. More liberal approval decisions will combine with 
improved techniques for monitoring individual patients to allow physicians to adjust prescribing 
in response to genetics and the body’s reaction. Give physicians a larger armory and let them 
decide which weapon is best for the task. 
Larger armories are also useful for a second problem. Many diseases are resistant to a silver 
bullet but succumb to silver bullets. The heterogeneity of patients, diseases and drugs and their 
multi-factorial combinations makes efficacy testing on final outcomes like mortality or life 
expectancy problematic. If we test three drugs against a disease each may fail to improve life 
expectancy even if all three drugs when used together or in sequence might cure the patient. 
But testing all possible combinations is far too costly to be reasonable. Combination therapies 
are best discovered in the field where knowledge can evolve and where individual 
circumstances of time and place can be adjusted for. The medical discovery process is why 
combination therapies and gold-standard treatments are often off-label treatments. Thus, we 
should be shifting our approval standards away from final-outcome mortality and towards safety 
and efficacy measured against the disease. Give physicians a larger armory and let them 
decide on tactics. 
Philosophically I support a more libertarian approach to drug approval, one that offers greater 
respect for patient autonomy. I have deemed this a Consumer Reports model of the FDA. 
Consumer Reports evaluates products and gives recommendations but it doesn’t forbid 
consumers from making choices given their own values and constraints. Consumer Reports 
helps consumers to make better choices. Similarly, a less paternalistic FDA would provide more 
information to patients and doctors, but it would also leave more choices in their hands. In 
addition to offering greater respect for patient autonomy, I believe that such an approach would 
lower costs and increase the number of new drugs and devices offering tremendous value to 
patients in the United States and the world. 
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It is important for a regulator to carefully balance sometimes conflicting concerns: 
protecting the public; ensuring that drug and devices development remains viable, also 
economically; keeping up with scientific developments and breakthroughs, emerging 
new methods, and changing insight. 
  
While it is necessary beyond question to have crystal clear procedures in place, this 
does not mean that every aspect of the regulatory framework should be time invariant. 
For example, when in one of the relatively early phase of the AIDS epidemic co-
enrolment appeared on stage, partly forced by patients’ rights group, and against what 
regulators, academic researchers, and industry considered wise, it turned out to be a 
very beneficial device. While co-enrolment challenged an until then seemingly 
foundational aspect of a clinical trial used for drug approval, and while it raised a 
number of complex methodological issues, it is partly to be credited for the development 
of highly active anti-retrovirus therapies. 
  
What is needed is clear mechanisms to continually examine the need for change and 
then procedures to implement such change. If rules are conceived ‘for eternity,’ the 
consequence is that no agreed upon mechanisms would exist regarding change. It is an 
illusion though that change can be kept out of the door and thus, when it inevitable 
happens, adjustments and changes would be governed by ad hoc procedures – 
precisely the reverse of what is intended. In other words, change and evolution should 
be ‘domesticated.’   
  
Evidently, this cannot be done within the regulators’ community alone, but should rather 
be done in concertation with the research communities in industry and academia, as 
well as with other stakeholders, in particular patients, payers, etc. 
  
It is fair to say that change happens all the time, and over recent decades regulators 
worldwide have contributed to structures that feel the pulse of changing evolutions and 
new developments. For example, joint conferences, ad hoc and on a regular basis, 
between regulators, academia, and industry are being held to the benefit of furthering 
insight. I would like to refer to workshops involving FDA and industry, EMA (European 
Medicines Agency) and the Drug Information Association (DIA), etc. Some of these are 
organized in conjunction with further partners such as the American Statistical 
Association (ASA), the Society for Clinical Trials (SCT), the European Federation of 
Statisticians in the Pharmaceutical Industry (EFSPI), etc. 
  
Another important vehicle is working parties and hearings on particular topics. I will 
mention a few. 
  
The FDA commissioned a project, under the auspices of the National Research Council 
and headed by Rod Little, that led to the 2010 report on Prevention and Treatment of 
Missing Data in Clinical Trials. Working party members held current and past positions 
in all three sectors (academia, industry, regulatory). Also, they came from various 
backgrounds within statistics and clinical trials (for example, some are experts in survey 
sampling, allowing for fruitful cross-sub-discipline symbiosis). Representatives from 
different and sometimes competing schools of thought partook. While the FDA took the 
initiative and, at properly organized points in time during the process they could state 
their expectations and feedback could be exchanged, the working party was entirely 
independent. 
  
The EMA has organized hearings on such topics as subgroup analysis. This allows 
input from the broader research communities, stakeholders in the topic and in different 
but related topics (e.g., orphan diseases), industry, and fellow regulators. 
  
A structure not yet mentioned but extremely important is the International Conference 
on Harmonization (ICH). A large majority of the issues of importance to a regulatory 
body are not confined to that body alone, but is of international significance. An example 
is the recent revision of the ICH-E9 on the statistical principles for clinical trials, where 
regulators and other stakeholders from the US, Europe and Japan have collaborated. 
  
A related international initiative is the recent working group on the concept of estimands. 
It is a simple but sometimes forgotten truth that discussing estimators, procedures, etc. 
is rather pointless if one has not reflected on what is being estimated. It is therefore a 
crucial endeavor to clearly define concepts and language, and assess how this can 
enhance drug development and the practice of clinical trials. A successful outcome of 
this project will be transforming in a number of areas. To give one example, sensitivity 
analysis regarding missing data can be harnessed better so that, routinely, a sensitivity 
analysis will encompass different estimators, under differing assumptions, but for the 
same estimands. 
  
Evidently, many scientific evolutions that are taking place right now and undoubtedly will 
in the future, will make the need for initiatives like the ones described above more 
needed than ever. Some evolutions are broad and general, such as big data and data 
science. Without engaging here in a discussion as to what they now really mean, it is 
important to assess sooner rather than later what the implications are for drug 
development, for the regulatory framework, and for the regulators. 
  
Other evolutions are more directly relevant for medicine, clinical practice, and hence for 
regulators. A key example is personalized medicine. I think it is a nice example to 
underscore just how much collaboration is needed. While scientific research is not the 
exclusive right of academic and other research institutions, it seems fair to say that 
there are important and highly technical research efforts needed, that go beyond what 
regulators and industry want to allocate their resources to. At the same time, there is a 
risk, when research is solely done in an academic environment, that ‘mathematization’ 
goes in the direction of ever more abstract and ever more general frameworks, that 
somewhat lose attraction to and relevance for biopharmaceutical development. Hence, 
joint projects, ideally co-sponsored between granting bodies, industry, and/or regulators, 
should be given a prominent place. 
  
So, all in all, it seems that a good number of initiatives have been taken in the past, to 
ensure modernization of thinking and  embracing of emerging concepts and tools. 
However, many of these are still of an ad hoc nature. It appears important to structurally 
organize the consultation and learning processes as much as possible, while indeed 
leaving room for spontaneous initiatives as well. On a regular basis, and following a 
clear but flexible protocol, it would seem important to identify areas where development 
and consultation is needed. Following this, there should be procedures to then identify 
to best achieve a particular goal, where a number of choices need to be considered. 
Without being complete, these would include: 
  
● Regulators to involve: FDA, EMA, Japan, ICH, others,… 
● Other stakeholders to involve: 
○ Academia and research institutions (if so, what disciplines) 
○ Industry 
○ Patients 
○ Payers, insurance companies,… 
○ … 
● Funding (internal funding, external resources, funding agencies, etc.) 
  
In conclusion, regulators should regulate how their own organization learns and 
transforms, in an orderly and stable fashion, easy to audit and very transparent, and in 
concertation with all relevant stakeholders, whilst at the same time strictly maintaining 
its independence. The latter means that the ultimate decision to change a procedure or 
adopt a new one, is strictly with the regulator, and with the regulator only.   
A key requirement is that agencies like the F.D.A. should be scientifically strong and 
independent, with a clearly defined mission and shielded from overly strong political and 
economic influences. In spite of their long standing, they may be too vulnerable at this 
time. Clear checks and balances in this respect are crucial.  
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The Food and Drug Administration is a remarkable agency, one of the crown jewels of the U.S. 
government. Its staff and structure are dedicated to safeguarding American public health, and 
although we sometimes complain about its role as gatekeeper, we all sleep better knowing that 
our foods and drugs have passed the FDA’s careful scrutiny. Its regulatory scope and process 
reflects the technical demands of its responsibilities, and the FDA is one of the very few federal 
agencies that have taken a lead in defining and developing the new field of regulatory 
science.[1] 
Although no regulator can or should attempt to anticipate every innovation that might require 
new approaches to regulation, in the case of healthcare, there are three areas of opportunity 
that may call for equally innovative responses from the FDA. The first is in making more use of 
predictive analytics to inform the FDA’s deliberations. As the trusted third party charged with the 
mandate to review clinical evidence for all drugs and devices marketed in the U.S., the FDA is 
privy to enormous amounts of valuable data. More aggressive rates of data collection will 
require more investment in data science, but this is only appropriate since such data is paid for 
with the flesh and blood of courageous patients enrolled in clinical trials. The array of potential 
new therapies today is dizzying, in immune-oncology, gene therapies, and the growing number 
of applications of gene editing. To meet this torrent of potential new applications, the FDA will 
need to expand its information technology base, not only to include new forms of data, but also 
to integrate its earlier collections of clinical trial information. 
Recent advances in data science using machine-learning techniques such as support vector 
machines and deep learning networks have transformed several other data-intensive industries 
such as consumer credit provision, insurance, marketing, and online retail sales. Given the 
magnitude and scope of data entrusted to the FDA, a host of insights regarding the viability of 
certain therapeutic lines of development should be available if the right estimation methods are 
used. These insights can lead to better decisions in the approval process, and can also allow 
the FDA to provide more refined guidance to the industry regarding unmet needs, overcrowding 
in certain therapeutic domains, and factors most predictive of clinical success and failure. The 
Information Exchange and Data Transformation (INFORMED) initiative in the FDA’s Office of 
Hematology and Oncology Projects[2] may be just the beginning of a broader effort to bring 
data science to the agency. 
The second area of opportunity for the FDA is in information sharing. While it would be a 
violation of trust for the FDA to release any of its data into the public domain, there may be a 
middle ground in allowing certain aggregated information to be shared so as to benefit the 
public good. For example, more accurate estimates of the probabilities of success of clinical 
trials by indication could lead to more efficient allocation of scarce resources, and such 
estimates are unlikely to jeopardize the proprietary information of any single industry sponsor. 
New methods developed by computer scientists for sharing selective portions of data—known 
as secure multiparty computation—may be particularly relevant for improving knowledge 
sharing while preserving privacy and protecting intellectual property. INFORMED may be an 
ideal testbed to evaluate the feasibility and desirability of such algorithms for the biopharma 
industry. 
The third and most important opportunity for the FDA to explore is to develop a framework for 
reflecting the patient perspective in its deliberations. Section 3002 of the recently passed 21st 
Century Cures Act requires the FDA to develop guidelines for patient-focused drug 
development, which includes collecting patient preference and experience data and 
incorporating this information in the drug approval process. This is particularly relevant in cases 
where the FDA is asked to review candidate therapies for terminal illnesses that have no 
existing treatments. In response to these urgent cases, the FDA has implemented several 
programs to expedite the approval process.[3] And in situations where the clinical evidence of 
efficacy is overwhelming, the FDA can move extremely quickly. For example, in the case of 
imatinib (Gleevec), which showed remarkable efficacy in Phase 1 for treating patients with 
chronic myeloid leukemia, the drug application was reviewed in a mere two and a half months, 
and went from Phase 1 to FDA approval in two and a half years under the FDA’s Accelerated 
Approval process.[4] However, for less clear-cut cases—which comprises the vast majority of 
candidate therapies—the approval process is not nearly as quick, and even a Fast Track review 
may lack the sense of urgency that a terminal patient experiences. Moreover, none of the FDA’s 
programs systematically measure and incorporate patient preferences explicitly in the approval 
decision, nor do any of these programs call for changing the statistical threshold by which 
clinical trials are evaluated. 
In several recent studies, my co-authors and I propose a formal framework for reflecting patient 
preferences in the FDA’s approval process using a well-known technique called Bayesian 
decision analysis (BDA). Briefly, BDA begins with the recognition that two types of errors are 
possible in deciding whether to approve or reject a new therapy: rejecting an effective therapy (a 
false negative) and approving an ineffective therapy (a false positive). The traditional approach 
for managing these errors is by setting a statistical threshold of 2.5% for the likelihood of a false 
positive, so that only those therapies exhibiting effects exceeding this stringent threshold in 
clinical trials will be approved. 
In statistical jargon, these are therapies with “p-values” lower than 2.5%. BDA takes a different 
approach: instead of using the same threshold of 2.5% for all cases, it allows us to compute an 
alternative threshold that minimizes the expected harm to current and future patients due to the 
two types of errors. For example, in desperate situations like pancreatic cancer or glioblastoma 
where death is imminent and no effective treatments exist, patients may be willing to face a 
greater than 2.5% chance that a drug is ineffective given their alternative. BDA offers a method 
for computing the approval threshold that minimizes the average harm to current and future 
patients from false positives and negatives, where harm includes patient-focused input such as 
quality-adjusted life years lost. In the case of glioblastoma, our application of BDA yields an 
optimal threshold of 47.5%, a much less restrictive approval threshold that is likely to increase 
the number of drugs for this terrible disease.[5] 
A natural consequence of this laxer threshold is, of course, more false positives—and the 
potential for a greater number of patients with adverse side-effects. This can be addressed 
through more vigilant post-approval surveillance by the FDA, and greater requirements for drug 
and device companies to provide data to the FDA on patient experience following approval. 
Failure to provide such data or evidence of an ineffective therapy can be grounds for revoking 
the approval. 
However, past experience shows that revoking an approved drug is extremely challenging for 
several reasons. Therefore, implementing BDA may require legislation to create an entirely new 
program for “Speculative Therapies” at the FDA. Such a program might involve provisional 
approval of a candidate therapy consisting of a two-year license to market the therapy to a pre-
specified patient population, no off-label use of the therapy, and regular monitoring and data 
reporting to the FDA by the manufacturer and/or patients’ physicians during the licensing. At the 
end of the two-year period one of three outcomes would occur: (a) the manufacturer can apply 
for a second two-year license (only one renewal will be allowed); (b) the license expires; or (c) 
the therapy receives the traditional FDA approval designation. Of course, at any point during the 
two-year period, the FDA can terminate the license if the accumulated data suggests an 
ineffective or unsafe therapy. While such a process may impose greater burdens on patients, 
manufacturers, and the FDA, it may be worthwhile if it brings some relief to patients facing 
mortal illnesses and extreme suffering. In this respect, a Speculative Therapies program may be 
viewed as a middle ground between a standard clinical trial and an approval, similar in spirit to 
the adaptive designs of sophisticated clinical trials with master protocols such as I-SPY 2,[6] 
LUNG-MAP,[7] and GBM-AGILE,[8] in which patient care and clinical investigations are 
simultaneously accomplished. 
Of course, in practice the FDA considers many factors beyond p-values in making their 
decisions. However, that process is opaque even to industry insiders, and the role of patient 
preferences is unclear. The recent FDA approval of the Duchenne muscular dystrophy drug 
eteplirsen (Exondys 51) despite relatively weak clinical evidence suggests that the FDA does 
take the patient’s perspective into account. BDA provides a systematic, objective, adaptive, and 
repeatable framework for explicitly incorporating patient preferences and burden-of-disease 
data in the therapeutic approval process.  As the noted biostatistician Don Berry said, “We 
should also focus on patient values, not just p-values.”[9] 
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The health of the nation and the world has been profoundly positively influenced by the pursuit 
and implementation of evidence based approaches for the prevention and treatment of diseases.  
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), along with other regulatory authorities 
throughout the world, have made critically important contributions to this pursuit.   The FDA 
recognizes their mission is to be “responsible for protecting public health by ensuring the safety, 
efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical devices; 
and by ensuring the safety of our nation's food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit 
radiation…FDA is responsible for advancing the public health by helping to speed innovations 
that make medical products more effective, safer, and more affordable and by helping the public 
get the accurate, science-based information they need to use medical products and foods to 
maintain and improve their health.” 
 The FDA has effectively addressed their mission by providing consistently strong 
leadership and oversight that has been of integral importance to protecting public health.  The 
FDA has been highly influential in the attainment of substantial evidence of efficacy and safety 
of approved drugs, biologics and devices by ensuring achievement of proper standards for 
design, conduct and analysis of registrational trials.  Among these significant favorable 
influences have been:  
 ~ Encouraging stepwise clinical development;  
 ~ Having proper controls in registrational trials, often best achieved through use of 
randomization;  
 ~ Properly addressing multiplicity through pre-specification of primary and secondary 
outcome measures and primary methods of analysis;  
 ~ Recognizing reliability and interpretability of efficacy is enhanced by assessing effects 
on direct measures of how a subject ‘feels, functions or survives,’ and recognizing the likelihood 
of being misled when relying on replacement endpoints such as biomarkers that have simply 
been shown to be correlated with direct measures of tangible benefit and often do not capture 
risks adequately;  
 ~ Recognizing the value of blinding when outcome measures are subjective;  
 ~ Guiding proper designs of non-inferiority trials;  
 ~ Ensuring clinical trials are designed and conducted in a manner to assure the safety and 
ethical protection of study participants  
 ~ Enhancing the quality of trial conduct by encouraging timely enrollment, best real 
world achievable adherence to experimental and control regimens, pro-active efforts to maximize 
retention, and maintaining confidentiality of efficacy data in ongoing trials;  
 ~ Recognizing that exploratory analyses usually should be viewed as generating 
hypotheses; and 
 ~ Recognizing the need for confirmatory trials, especially in settings where positive 
predictive probabilities for efficacy are not strong (such as when obtaining marginally positive 
results in a setting where the pre-trial likelihood of meaningful benefit was rather low), or when 
post-hoc analyses would properly be viewed as being hypothesis generating, or when important 
safety signals have been identified.   
 The FDA’s role is of integral importance in addressing conflicts of interest in medical 
research.  There is a pervasive interest in obtaining positive results that would enable increased 
options for caregivers to offer their patients, and would provide enhanced reputations for 
researchers and financial benefits to sponsors.  While these are valid interests, they can conflict 
with the greater interest in ensuring the integrity and reliability of clinical research.  There is an 
inherent high level of multiplicity in clinical research, arising from multiple outcome measures, 
methods of analysis, subgroups of patients and analyses over time.  Without proper oversight 
including that consistently provided by FDA, such multiplicity provides strong risks for 
misleading conclusions, especially when data are explored by those looking for positive results 1. 
This was discussed in a presentation in May 2016 by commentator John Oliver in ‘Last Week 
Tonight’ 2, who recognized such risk for bias “because of scientists feeling pressured to come up 
with eye-catching positive results…to get those results, there are all sorts of ways that, 
consciously or not, you can tweak your study, you can alter how long it lasts, our make your 
random sample too small to be reliable, or engage in something that scientists call P-
Hacking…it basically means collecting lots of variables and then playing with your data until 
you find something that counts as statistically significant but is probably meaningless.”  These 
issues are of particular concern in the pursuit of personalized medicine due to the inherently high 
magnitude of multiplicity in identification of subgroups of patients who benefit from new 
therapies, the need for accurate clinical laboratory tests to appropriately guide personalized 
medicine strategies, and the still evolving regulatory oversight process for laboratory tests.  
Negative consequences of poorly understood or weakly applied regulatory oversight processes 
for laboratory developed tests have been vividly demonstrated. There are numerous examples of 
clinical tests promoted for personalized medicine that were made clinically available prematurely 
3 or that were incorporated into clinical trials where they were used to guide treatment decisions 
but later found to be based on flawed evidence or even fraudulent data 4.  Failure to insist on 
good clinical and laboratory practices, apply rigorous standards for the design, conduct, and 
analysis of biomedical research, and implement safeguards to address conflicts of interest poses 
threats to the integrity of biomedical research and exposes patients to potential harms.   
 The FDA’s ability to address its responsibility “for advancing the public health by 
helping to speed innovations” is enhanced by its privileged position of having broad access to 
ongoing clinical research.  The efficiency of the scientific process is increased if we are 
enlightened by the lessons learned from past experiences, whether they be successes or failures.  
However, for pharmaceutical and biotech companies that collectively lead a substantive 
component of the clinical research effort to develop and evaluate drugs, biologics and devices, 
clear competitive advantages are achieved by protecting their confidential and proprietary 
information and trade secrets. This provides strong motivation for these companies to reveal as 
little as possible about the successes and failures in their scientific process.  Fortunately, 
regulatory authorities have broad access to sponsor’s data through their oversight 
responsibilities. These broad experiences enable FDA to be more enlightened when they guide 
clinical trial development and to make more informed judgments about whether evidence is 
sufficient for marketing approval and about how to proceed when it is not. 
 Reducing FDA’s regulatory authority, for example by substantially lowering the 
standards for strength of evidence required for marketing approval, and in turn increasing the 
reliance on post-marketing observational studies to provide enlightenment about efficacy and 
safety, likely would be treacherous for the public.  Interventions often have meaningful positive 
or negative effects on the rate of key efficacy or safety outcomes.  When these effects are not at 
least 5- to 10-fold in magnitude, there is considerable risk that they would not be detected 
through evidence from the marketplace that lacks formal controls.  For illustration, hundreds of 
thousands of patients received encainide and flecainide for arrhythmia suppression after 
myocardial infarction, until the randomized Cardiac Arrhythmia Suppression Trial established 
such use actually tripled the death rate; hormonal replacement treatment was widely used by 
menopausal women, until the randomized Women’s Health Initiative trial established such use 
increased the risks of heart attacks and strokes; Cox-2 Inhibitors, Vioxx and Bextra, were widely 
used for pain relief in osteoarthritis and rheumatoid arthritis patients until randomized clinical 
trials collectively involving fifty thousand patients revealed these agents increased the risks of 
MACE, (i.e., cardiovascular death, stroke or myocardial infarction); and Beta-Carotene was 
widely used until the randomized Beta-Carotene and Retinol Efficacy Trial revealed such use 
induced increased incidence and risk of death from lung cancer.  Numerous other examples 
reveal peril that would result from a regulatory strategy heavily dependent on evidence from the 
marketplace. 
 We will continue to hear arguments about the merits of weakening regulatory standards.  
While doing so surely could reduce costs of drug development prior to regulatory approval, such 
an approach could induce far greater costs to the public and even to drug developers. 
 ꟷFor the public, there would be important opportunity costs, occurring when patients 
chase some novel intervention having evidence that is more hype than substance: these patients 
may be giving up other options that would have provided benefit.  Furthermore, allowing 
widespread expenditures on interventions for which there is only scant evidence of true benefit 
and safety would further accelerate the rate of increase in costs of health care and, given that 
resources available for health care are not unlimited, would adversely impact the level of 
resources available for safe and effective interventions. 
 ꟷFor drug developers, there could be increased risks from litigation due to safety events 
either that are real but were not discovered by the less rigorous regulatory process, or that are 
only alleged to be related to a product but where its sponsor does not have the scientific evidence 
to justify its safety. 
 Weakening FDA’s regulatory standards in order to reduce the burden of the drug 
development process could fail to achieve the intended outcome since reliable scientific evidence 
about the efficacy and safety of drugs, biologics and devices, usually best provided by controlled 
clinical trials that are properly designed, conducted and analyzed, is of critical importance not to 
only to the FDA, but also to other regulatory authorities throughout the world and surely to 
patients, payers and providers who face the complex challenges of choosing among available 
health care options.  
 It might be argued that stronger rather than weaker regulatory standards are needed.  
Evidence is provided by Liz Szabo’s article, appearing in USA Today on February 9, 2017,5 
entitled “Treating Cancer: Hope vs HypeꟷDozens of New Cancer Drugs Do Little to Improve 
Survival, Frustrating Patients”.  Concerns are reported “that the Food and Drug Administration 
is approving cancer drugs without proof that they cure patients or help them live longer”, and 
that more cancer drugs are being approved simply based on effects on the biomarker-based 
endpoint, ‘progression free survival’. Vinay Prasad of Oregon Health and Sciences University 
provided evidence that the link between effects on ‘progression free survival’ and effects on 
overall survival often is weak. FDA’s Richard Pazdur conveyed the proper intention, “FDA 
wants to give patients a chance to benefit as soon as possible,” at times relying on long term 
post marketing studies to provide the evidence needed to reliably establish efficacy and safety.  
Researcher Diana Zuckerman of the National Center for Health Research reported that many of 
these post marketing studies have not provided clear evidence, with Prasad recognizing it is 
uncommon for post marketing studies to be completed establishing survival advantages when 
drugs are approved without such evidence.  Otis Brawley, chief medical officer at the American 
Cancer Society, expressed concerns that FDA is lowering its standards, and that “Studies suggest 
that both patients and doctors tend to overestimate drugs’ benefit, but underestimate their risks 
and side effects.”  This access has come at significant financial cost. Referencing the Center for 
Health Policy and Outcomes at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, the article reports that 
“Cancer drugs approved last year cost an average of $171,000 a year.” 
 Is the FDA in need of a major change in the way it regulates? While the FDA has been 
very effective in addressing its mission, nevertheless as with any successful entity, it will be 
important to pursue thoughtful and creative approaches, in order to adapt to the changing 
landscape of medical product development and enhance the ability of the FDA to protect public 
health in the future.  The following should be among such approaches: 
ꟷEnhance the FDA’s ability to address their mission by ensuring they have necessary resources 
and by reducing the influence of political or special interests that conflict with their primary 
goals of protecting the public.  
ꟷEncourage ongoing consideration of creative approaches to the scientific process and to 
regulatory oversight that would improve the efficiency while maintaining or increasing 
reliability, and that would effectively address new types of challenges that may emerge.  Some 
potential approaches include: 
     ꟷIncrease support for pragmatic trials, conducted in real world settings with streamlined 
procedures for screening and enrollment, with endpoints (such as mortality in oncology trials) 
that are highly relevant to subjects and that can be readily assessed in a straightforward manner, 
with reduced burdens to subjects and researchers and with reduced risk of missing data that 
would compromise the ability to obtain unbiased assessments of treatment benefits and risks. 
     ꟷReduce the cost of clinical trials by reducing the collection of information that is not of 
integral importance to the benefit-to-risk assessment and, in particular, reduce line-by-line on site 
monitoring of data collection forms (efforts related to those of the previous FDA Commissioner, 
Robert Califf 6).  
     ꟷPursue creative approaches to achieve timely and reliable evaluation of personalized 
medicine interventions, recognizing the importance of identifying outcomes having sufficient 
sensitivity that intervention effects can be addressed in smaller sample sizes, recognizing 
reliability is greatly enhanced by having randomized controls and using direct ‘feels, functions, 
survives’ outcome measures, and recognizing the importance of increasing the number of 
participating clinical sites and expanding their geographic reach and accessibility. 
     ꟷContinue use of regulatory approaches for providing early public access, such as accelerated 
approval, while improving the ability to achieve timely completion of validation trials that 
reliability address effects on ‘feels, functions, or survives’ outcome measures, such as by use of 
pragmatic trials conducted in a large number of sites, and improving the ability to withdraw 
marketing approval when validation trials do not provide evidence in a timely manner that 
reliably establishes substantial evidence of efficacy and safety. 
     ꟷMore strongly encourage that data from completed randomized clinical trials be shared in a 
timely manner to enhance transparency and enlightenment, as advocated by the Institute of 
Medicine.  
     ꟷIncrease the collaboration between regulatory authorities worldwide; this is particularly 
important when addressing emerging public health emergencies. 
 If we continue to maintain regulations in areas other than health care, such as 
authorizations required to drive a motorized vehicle including having a driver’s license, abiding 
by laws regarding use of seat belts and helmets, and carrying insurance, then surely there is need 
for proper regulatory oversight of the health care process.  Public health is enhanced by evidence 
based medicine, where the interests of the public are protected by the oversight of the research 
process provided by regulatory authorities such as FDA.  The goal is not simply to ensure 
availability of interventions for the treatment and prevention of diseases to enable to public to 
have ‘choices’, but rather to ensure there are adequate insights about benefits and risks of these 
interventions to enable ‘informed choices’.  Attainment of the best possible outcomes for patients 
will require careful balancing of benefits and risks for the full spectrum of medical products 7.  A 
strong FDA has an integral role in achieving that goal.   
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